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Editorial
Technology Research in Mine Action:  
Enough is Enough
by Russell Gasser
Twenty years ago I started work on a doc-torate thesis asking the question: “Why has research into new technologies for 
mine action had so little success?”1 My research 
discovered that about one billion dollars had 
been spent by the year 2000 on fundamental and 
applied research to produce new technologies 
to solve the mine problem.1 The resulting ben-
efit for humanitarian mine action was indeed 
very small. Since then, large-scale spending has 
continued with limited success. Researchers and 
their funders have not learned from continued, 
expensive failure. There is clear cause and effect 
at work, which means that many research proj-
ects and programs have followed a similar route 
to failure.
New technology has an important role in 
making mine action faster, safer, cheaper, or 
some useful combination of these three. Major 
gains to safety and/or productivity have result-
ed from the use of satellite and cell phones, GPS, 
digital cameras, laptops and tablet computers, 
map plotters, Google Earth mapping, polycar-
bonate for visors and Kevlar for protective vests 
and much more. However, none of these gains 
came from research into new technologies for 
mine action, they all came from adapting and ap-
plying useful, off-the-shelf products. These prod-
ucts could afford the high cost of research and 
development as they had a large-scale market.
Mutual misunderstanding between re-
searchers and demining organizations began in 
the early 1990s when research into mine action 
technology started receiving large amounts of 
funding. Field practitioners in humanitarian demining want-
ed better tools and equipment as soon as possible and at af-
fordable prices. Researchers offered to help but didn’t manage 
to communicate that academic and industrial research is ex-
pensive and usually several years away from yielding finished 
products. Too many researchers did not understand why de-
miners were so reluctant to test unproven equipment in live 
minefields. Too often both sides felt let down by each other.
What researchers produce is usually several steps away 
from being usable in the field. Research results need to be 
turned into realistic prototypes that can be tested, which is 
the first step. Prototype tests then lead to a production de-
sign, and finally a production version that is first tested in 
simulation and then certified in live areas. However, this does 
not automatically mean the technology is going to be cost- 
effective or worth using, and each one of these development 
steps can cost more than the original research.
Researchers and their funders were highly motivated by 
what they saw as a moral obligation to focus their efforts on 
this humanitarian task. There was apparently a widespread 
assumption that there was no available means of clearing 
mines and that any advance—no matter how complex or 
costly—would be a step forward. In fact, manual demining 
methods were already well developed by the late 1980s. When 
properly managed, manual clearance was safe and reasonably 
cost-effective. My investigations showed that as much as 80 
percent of the demining research aimed to improve the de-
tection of buried mines, usually minimum metal mines, and 
ignored the majority of other urgent problems that field man-
agers face. In the 1990s, a minority of researchers began to 
analyze the problem. The Development Technology Unit of 
the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom, where I 
was working, observed deminers in Cambodia from a safe 
distance.  We discovered that they spent up to 70 percent of 
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their time cutting vegetation. Clearly, the vegetation clear-
ance problem was urgent and led to the Tempest mini-flail, 
locally produced in Phnom Penh.2
In terms of reducing the cost and time of returning land to 
productive use, area reduction (defining the boundaries of the 
area that has to be cleared) and the resulting release of land 
without clearance is probably the single most important is-
sue. Although the topic was mentioned at conferences, only a 
few mine action field practitioners flagged this as an issue and 
researchers did not pick up the topic.3 
Expensive research projects continued to produce margin-
al gains in mine detection by developing equipment suitable 
for use on flat ground without vegetation. In terms of pure re-
search, this is the obvious path: start with the theory, develop 
the techniques, and gradually apply them to real world sce-
narios by developing prototypes to test. But this was not what 
the mine action world wanted. In 2016, as many countries ap-
proach the end of proactive mine clearance and are moving to 
management of residual contamination (MRC), the need for 
long-term research is becoming even harder to justify.
In the 1990s, there was a tango that went around and 
around but led nowhere. At meetings, researchers would ask 
“What are the key problems that we should be working on?” 
and field staff would reply, “What are the main areas where 
you can make a difference?” I remember one well-intentioned 
project where the researchers gave the mine action staff a long 
list of issues that the research could address and asked for pri-
oritization. The response was that all the problems were “very 
important.” Thus, no progress was made as no priorities were 
identified. Priorities cannot be determined by emotional ap-
peal but instead need analysis and tough decisions. Even less 
common were cost-benefit analyses.
At times, the degree of separation between the research 
lab and the field led to multiple failures. One research proj-
ect co-funded by the European Commission discovered that 
their lab equipment overheated and failed during field trials 
in Africa. Did their field partner not inform them about the 
hot weather because it seemed too obvious? Without a pri-
or survey, the manufacturer of a large, mine clearance ma-
chine complained that Cambodia had the “wrong type of 
minefields” despite spending large amounts of donor money 
to have the machine transported.
Six Primary Reasons Why Mine Action 
Technology Research Has Yielded Few Results
1. There is a deep-seated psychological need to address 
the horror of stepping on an unseen, anti-personnel (AP) 
mine as the top priority. There is also the feeling of “just one 
more breakthrough and we will be there.” Both of these tend 
to overrule rational analysis. This is not a research issue; fund- 
raising also relies on the public response to the horror of AP 
mines. Unexploded ordnance kills and injures more peo-
ple than AP mines, and unplanned explosions of munition 
stockpiles kill even more. However, the research proposals 
that seek to improve AP mine detection often focus on rela-
tively uncommon minimum metal mines.
2. While researchers wanted to improve knowl-
edge and its application, field practitioners usually thought 
the purpose of donor funding was to provide better tools 
and equipment in the short to medium term. Too much re-
search focused on generating solutions to problems that were 
not clearly identified. In one case, a project that cost sever-
al million Euros of public money showed that the probabil-
ity of detecting mines was reduced when the project’s “data 
fusion” method was applied. In the project’s final evalua-
tion, a university professor declared that the project was 
a useful contribution in that it showed what did not work, 
which was true but did not immediately benefit deminers. 
  Whereas many researchers and donors want to focus 
on breakthrough technologies, demining needs incremen-
tal improvements to well-established methods and technolo-
gies. Dismissing incremental improvements because they are 
somehow less important is a serious error. Metal detectors are 
an example of a successful, incremental improvement; perfor-
mance now is far better than it was 20 years ago; sensitivity, 
background compensation, size, weight and battery life have 
all significantly improved by manufacturers. Advanced and 
automatic data fusion methods for multi-sensor detection re-
ceived millions of research money to seek a breakthrough but 
made little or no impact in the field.
3. There has been a widespread failure to understand the 
economics of humanitarian demining. There are two parts to 
this misunderstanding: the first involves the overall econom-
ic purpose of mine action whereas the second concerns the 
cost of going from lab research to a finished, usable product. 
  There may be no overall benefit from a modest reduction 
in clearance costs if the money is diverted away from the local 
economy in the mine-affected country and instead supports 
high-tech research in first-world countries. The purpose 
of mine action is to save lives, reduce injuries and help re- 
establish livelihoods postwar. Employing hundreds, or even 
thousands, of deminers is an effective way to stimulate the 
local economy. The effect multiplies and boosts recovery 
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efforts as money recirculates around the community, and 
local people start small businesses. If the objective of mine 
action is to rebuild war-torn economies and help local peo-
ple, diverting resources to a rich country to pay for advanced 
technology in order to get a small gain on price per square 
meter makes no sense at all. Achieving the overall purpose 
of mine action is what matters; cost per square meter is only 
one part of this. Some new technology proposals have even 
threatened to drive up the cost of clearance. One such project 
received millions of Euros of public money and was based on 
detecting explosive using neutrons. The neutron generator 
required was very expensive, had a short life span and was so 
powerful it required registration by the user to comply with 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in force at the time. 
  The second economic issue is the gap caused 
by the amount of time and money that success-
ful laboratory research needs to yield a certified 
product for the field. Transition is difficult, slow and ex-
pensive, and usually costs more than the original research. 
  The market for improved mine action technologies is 
small and insufficient for expensive commercial develop-
ment. While I was project officer for new technologies at the 
European Commission in the early 2000s, many research 
funding proposals overestimated the potential sales of a fu-
ture product and underestimated the cost of product devel-
opment. A few projects predicted that the annual sales of 
their product would be worth more than the best estimate 
we had for the global budget for all humanitarian demining 
equipment worldwide.
4. Risk management has unexpected side effects. Most 
donors are not specialists and know little about mine action 
technology. To manage risk, they seek subject experts, who 
can make decisions on which projects to fund and how to 
evaluate progress. For some public sector donors, the use 
of these independent experts is a requirement. Available 
experts 20 years ago were usually academics with deep 
knowledge of the technology proposed or one of a group of 
recognized international mine action consultants who of-
ten had limited experience with military demining. It was 
difficult to recruit active field staff who comprehensively 
understood humanitarian mine action at the ground level; 
evaluating research proposals was widely viewed as a com-
plete waste of time for field staff. The situation was exacer-
bated by the requirement of some agencies for consultants 
to have advanced university degrees. Non-specialist do-
nors had no understanding of the enormous gap between 
the pool of available subject experts to decide on research 
proposals and the field practitioners who wanted better 
tools and equipment for immediate use in far-off lands. 
  Another effect of the dominance of military demining 
experience 20 years ago was large-scale funding for research 
projects focused on well-established military demining tasks. 
Some of these had little or no application to humanitarian de-
mining. There was no intention that humanitarian funding 
should be used for military research, but at times that is what 
happened for some high-cost technologies later used for mili-
tary purposes but not for humanitarian demining. 
5. A number of high-profile research projects, of-
ten supported by internationally well-known people, have 
gained public support and leveraged large-scale funding. 
The projects proposed were often expensive and unfeasible 
(e.g., reliable, airborne detection of individual buried mines 
through vegetation; rolling heavy objects over uneven ter-
rain in a random way without recording exactly where they 
passed), or were so expensive as to be entirely impractical 
for humanitarian purposes even if the technology worked. 
The publicity only mentioned the potential benefits, not the 
costs: “we have a responsibility to get these mines out of the 
ground and make the land safe for people to live a normal 
life without fear.”4 These projects not only wasted money but 
created a false public perception of demining and the role of 
mine action technology, and marginalized the demining or-
ganizations that they claimed to help. Moreover, they ignore 
the current solution: the properly trained and equipped hu-
man deminer. 
6. Mine action practitioners have not always shown 
interest in the best research ideas and, at times have in-
discriminately treated all research as equally lacking in 
value. For example, in 1999, a student research team dis-
covered that oval, cross-section prodders (a cheap and sim-
ple tool) significantly reduced the force needed to prod 
into hard soil compared to normal, round-section prod-
ders. Accidentally detonating mines while prodding in 
hard soil is a known source of accidents, so this simple, 
research-based advancement in technology could be ex-
pected to be widely used and well-publicized in the mine ac-
tion community. The risk to deminers could be reduced by 
“Metal detectors are an example of a successful, 
incremental improvement...”
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specifying oval prodders in operating procedures, contracts 
and mine action standards. However, the idea has not been 
widely embraced or shared. Is this the result of a “not in-
vented here” attitude, or just poor communication of ideas? 
Conclusion
As mine action in many countries moves from proactive 
clearance to reactive MRC, there is a real opportunity to im-
prove the take-up and cost effectiveness of new technology. 
MRC is a well understood process with a long history of suc-
cess, especially in northern Europe. There is already a wide 
range of commercial equipment, from simple hand tools to 
hi-tech systems, that is in daily use in countries still clear-
ing explosive remnants from the two World Wars. There is no 
significant technology gap that prevents effective MRC from 
working in Europe.
Adapting existing techniques and solutions for use in 
new climates and areas without the supporting infrastruc-
ture found in Europe will naturally require some resources. 
However, we cannot possibly justify repetitive research and 
development in an effort to reinvent the wheel. 
For proactive clearance, there are a lot of adaptive and in-
genious solutions that have already been developed under 
field conditions or through appropriate research such as the 
oval-section prodders mentioned above, or the use of rakes. 
Many of these solutions are known only locally because they 
have not been published or shared. Busy field staff rarely have 
spare time, extra money or interest in the amount of work re-
quired to publish an article or attend a conference. An equip-
ment catalogue that is more than a manufacturer’s sales sheet 
is needed. Collecting and sharing information about inventive 
solutions to regional problems (as well as broader problems) 
is both urgently needed and far more cost and time effective 
than high-technology research. An online catalogue that in-
cludes photos, videos, interviews and information about ac-
tual results, including costs and benefits, would be a valuable 
resource. Translation is an essential requirement for accessi-
bility, while constant maintenance and updating is necessary. 
After the information is collected, it should be made 
available to people who can use it. This goes far beyond pro-
viding a website or a printed document, even beyond more 
accessible technology such as apps for smartphones and tab-
lets. Sharing information must be an active process to iden-
tify, contact, interest and earn the trust of people who could 
benefit from the information. This is perhaps where research 
is needed. How do we get field managers, especially national 
staff, to take an interest in and put aside time to learn about 
technologies that could benefit their programs? The Croatian 
Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) and the Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) organize mine action 
technology conferences, but at the last UNMAS/GICHD con-
ference, out of more than 70 participants, fewer than 10 were 
national staff from mine affected countries. How can we en-
courage more people who will select the technologies needed 
for their country and approve equipment budgets to attend? 
Why is this not already a priority?
Mine action could learn from other areas where a commu-
nity of practice has been established to support this type of tech-
nology transfer. Building a community of practice is not an easy 
task but would ensure that mine action technology moves for-
ward in terms of cost effectiveness and deminer safety.  
In addition, donors who are interested in funding mine ac-
tion technology research would benefit from learning about 
the realities of technical needs, the low probability of getting 
past the research stage to a production prototype, and the 
need for cost-benefit and technical appraisal.
Perhaps the most important question to ask is why mil-
lions of dollars is available for research into technology that 
is unlikely to succeed whereas funding to develop and share 
solutions based on existing technology is sparse. This is the 
core question that needs to be answered if we are to learn from 
experience.
It’s time to end the current situation where huge expendi-
tures have achieved so little, and technology research contin-
ues to deliver poor value for money. 
See endnotes page 66
The author wishes to thank Bob Keeley for his comments on 
the draft.
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